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Abstract
Human failure events (HFEs) are the unit of analysis in human reliability analysis (HRA). HFEs are essentially human errors that 
have an adverse consequence on system safety. In HRAs in the nuclear power industry, HFEs are typically defined in the 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), staring with possible hardware failures and then identifying opportunities for human 
action or inaction to affect those failures. In other industries, the HFE may not be predefined in this manner. For example, in the 
case of some oil and gas applications, the overarching quantitative risk analysis (QRA) does not identify HFEs. As human factors 
experts perform HRAs, there is difficulty in characterizing human actions in such a way that they represent the right level of
analysis suitable for inclusion in the PSA or QRA. This paper provides guidance to help analysts in such a situation. The paper 
presents seven steps to build suitable HFEs based on an initial human factors task analysis.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
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1. Introduction
To be effective, human reliability analysis (HRA) must have clearly defined units of analysis. In the probabilistic 
safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear power industry, this unit of analysis is defined as the human failure 
event (HFE). The HFE encompasses any hardware system that can be adversely affected by human action or 
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inaction. As noted in [1], HRA methods often lack a consistent level of task decomposition at the HFE modeling 
phase, which can result in high variability in the resultant human error probabilities (HEPs).The level of task 
decomposition also affects the dependency between tasks, which may have a further effect in driving the HEP.The 
issue is not that different HRA methods necessarily produce different results for the same HFE; rather, different 
HRA methods may decompose the HFE to different levels.Thus, the quantification of the same event may entail 
different assumptions and, to some extent, different groupings of tasks across HRA methods. In other words, 
because of a lack of a common task decomposition framework, HRA methods may not be using the same unit of 
analysis when producing the HEP. 
This problem is magnified as HRA methods are generalized from existing nuclear applications to new domains 
like oil and gas. In the petroleum sector, the quantitative risk analyses (QRAs)—which are related to PSAs—have 
historically not modeled HFEs. Thus, where practice has given rise to HFEs in PSAs, the HFEs must be defined and 
inserted into the QRA for many oil and gas applications. The task of performing the HRA resideswith human factors 
experts, who build the HRA using methods that have not been aligned to the PSA. For example, as noted in [2] and 
[3] and depicted in Fig. 1, whereas the PSA may look top-down at the subset of hardware failures that feature a 
human contribution, human factors may look bottom-up at the subset of human activities that result in human errors. 
The products of these two events—both of which are technically HFEs—may not be identical. To help resolve this 
issue, this paper provides a simplified guideline to ensure that the human factors expert—using techniques native to 
the field—will produce a set of HFEs that are compatible with the HFEs that are incorporated in a PSA or QRA. 
This paper consolidates and builds on HFE modeling insights previously documented in [2-4].
2. A guideline for HRA task decomposition
In order to reconcile the disconnection between human factors analysis and HFEs in practice, this section 
presents a seven-step guideline for conducting a task analysis that culminates in usable input for HRA in a PSA. The 
guideline is appropriate for applications such as an HRA in which HFEs have not been predefined as part of the 
PSA. The guideline references specific methods to use, e.g., the SPAR-H HRA method [5], but the general approach 
is interchangeable with a variety of alternate methods. The guideline aligns the bottom-up task analysis approach 
with the top-down PSA approach for defining and analysing HFEs in HRA.
Fig. 1. Two approaches to defining human failure events.
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2.1. Step 1: perform task analysis
A task analysis is a description of the steps that are carried out as part of an activity, and it provides a systematic 
means of organizing information collected around the tasks. The level of detail of a task analysis can vary 
considerably, although the general guidance is to tailor the level of the analysis to the requirements at hand. For 
example, a task analysis to support the design of a new system might have a very detailed analysis of ways to 
improve the design; in contrast, a task analysis to support HRA will tend to be heavily grounded in identifying 
sources of human error. A task analysis is not strickly speaking a requirement for an HRA. Rather, a task analysis is 
a way of understanding the activities that are being analyzed and translating these details into the level of detail 
suitable for the PSA and QRA. The task analysis helps to define the HFE and also helps to identify the human errors 
that may be present in an activity. The task analysis is also the basis for understanding the impact of specific 
performance shaping factors (PSFs) and thereby the basis for the quantification in many methods. As such, it is an 
invaluable stepping stone toward the completed HRA.
Embrey [6] distinguishes between action-oriented and cognitive approaches for task analysis. Action-oriented 
approaches involve observable behaviors (such as visible tasks), while cognitive approaches look primarily at 
problem solving and decision making. Tasks may entail taking an action or making a decision, while the steps to 
support those tasks may involve actions or information gathering (i.e., perceptual tasks).An important consideration 
is that most actions and decisions are governed by overarching goals. Whether procedurally driven or based on the 
expertise of the operator, a series of goals guide behavior. Goals are therefore a useful way to group sets of actions 
together. Also, since the precursors to actions—namely the decisions operators make—are not always readily 
observable as actions, understanding goals can help the analyst determine what decisions might be necessary for the 
operators to make. The analyst should ask questions of the operators and other subject matter experts to identify 
goals as part of data collection for the HRA.
Further, goals are broken down into subgoals or tasks necessary to accomplish the goals. For example, if the 
high-level goal is to stop a gas leak, subgoals or tasks might include closing a valve and stopping the process that is 
producing the gas. These subgoals shape the actions the operator takes, including the possible ways to mitigate the 
problem. Goals are also important to understanding the type of errors that are possible. In the parlance of Reason 
[7], if the operator has the right understanding of the problem at hand, the errors that might occur would include 
slips (doing the wrong thing despite a good understanding) and lapses (failure to do the right thing). If the operator 
does not have proper understanding of the problem at hand, the potential error would be a mistake. Such error 
taxonomies are helpful to anticipating the types of errors that might occur for different situations.
There are numerous methods for task analysis (e.g., [8]), and a full review is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Many task analysis methods are simply refinements of basic, established approaches. Still other task analysis 
methods that were designed for particular human factors applications may not prove suitable for HRA applications. 
Kirwan [9], in discussing task analysis specifically for HRA, limits his discussion to a handful of methods, but 
highlights in particular hierarchical task analysis (HTA). HTA is a task analysis method that decomposes tasks 
hierarchically according to goals at the top level and the tasks at the lower levels that are required to accomplish the 
goals. This approach is very widely used for both human factors and HRA applications, and it represents a simple 
yet flexible approach akin to many contemporary simplified HRA methods.
Analysts should not be limited to HTA when other techniques are warranted. For example, [9] specifically 
mentions tabular task analysis (TTA), which is an extension of HTA that may prove especially effective for 
cataloging which users are involved in particular tasks, error opportunities for the tasks, etc. This information is 
represented in a table format. A variant of TTA—operational sequence diagrams—represent similar information 
graphically. While the many variants on task analysis may provide additional insights to the analyst while 
completing the HRA, it should be noted that most such techniques add layers of complexity and time onto the 
analysis. The resources required for such an analysis may be justified, especially in the face of complex, difficult to 
understand, and highly risk significant activities. Otherwise, the analysts should strive to be efficient in completing 
the analysis in a cost effective and timely manner. HTA and TTA can help ensure this objective.
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Good explanations on how to conduct HTA can be found in any of the various summary articles by Annett 
published in the early 2000s [10-12]. HTA breaks down a given human-performed task according to goals and 
subgoals. Typical steps include:
x Align analysis level of decomposition to the purpose of the analysis (e.g., decompose tasks according to the level 
that human error identification is possible, which serves as the stop rule for the analysis).
x Determine task goals.
x Acquire data to support and document the task decomposition.
x Iterate the task breakdown with subject matter experts until the detail is accurate and sufficient.
x Filter for the most significant operations (e.g., determine that the task has a reasonable probability and 
consequence of error—otherwise the task should not be considered further in the analysis).
x Identify means to solve identified problems in the task analysis.
For HRA, the HTA needs to decompose to the subgoal/plan level where the analyst can look concretely at 
opportunities for error. For HRA specific purposes (in contrast to human factors focused on the design of new 
systems), an analyst would not necessarily need to look at the opportunity to remedy these potential failures, 
although the analyst should in his or her data collection identify opportunities for recovery from any potential 
failures. 
2.2. Step 2: review the subgoals according to an error taxonomy 
The result of the task analysis is a set of goals that cluster sets of actions in the task and a set of subgoals that 
comprise the individual steps to achieving the goal. Each subgoal may be further subdivided into additional sub-
subgoals and so on as necessary to achieve each subgoal. After the completion of the task analysis, the next step is 
to review the significant subgoals for their potential for human error. A number of error taxonomies exist that 
support task analysis, e.g., the Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) [13], the 
Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) [14], or even the recent 
Integrated Decision-tree Human Error Analysis System (IDHEAS) [15]. The SHERPA and TRACEr error mode 
taxonomies, among numerous others (see [8] for a review), are functionally fairly similar and may be used 
interchangeably as desired. The TRACEr approach is a bit more complex, featuring a total of eight taxonomies to 
cover the error context, the production of the error, and the recovery of the error for both predictive and 
retrospective analysis. In practice, however, TRACEr covers most of the same errors as SHERPA, with the addition 
of gradations of scale. Whereas SHERPA is relatively absolute in terms of an error occurring or not occurring, 
TRACEr scales the errors (e.g., too little action or action too long). TRACEr also delineates internal and external 
error modes, corresponding to cognition (internal) and action (external), although this distinction is implicit in 
SHERPA. 
IDHEAS is actually an HRA method in itself, but it includes a generic psychological taxonomy as part of the 
method. The taxonomy behind IDHEAS includes a number of cognitive errors but very few action error modes. 
Whereas it may be easier to identify and catalog action errors in SHERPA, IDHEAS provides a more complete way 
to identify and catalog cognitive errors. A variant of SHERPA presented for Step 3 essentially aligns SHERPA with 
IDHEAS.
Table 1 presents the SHERPA taxonomy as an example.This taxonomy provides a concise account of errors of 
omission and commission. If the bottom-level subgoals do not present a reasonable opportunity for error according 
to the taxonomy, the analyst should eliminate that overarching task from the analysis. For each subgoal that presents 
an opportunity for error, the analyst should document the opportunities for recovery from these errors.For typical 
HRA, it is not necessary to complete the remedy analysis portion of SHERPA (which is useful for improving the 
process in a design review) but rather to identify actions the system or human might take to recover. The main 
purpose of the taxonomic review is simply to screen for the reasonableness that an error could occur at the subgoal 
level.
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Table 1. SHERPA error taxonomy.
Action Errors Checking Errors
A1-Operation too long/short C1-Check omitted
A2-Operation mistimed C2-Check incomplete
A3-Operation in wrong direction C3-Right check on wrong object
A4-Operation too little/much C4-Wrong check on right object
A5-Misalign C5-Check mistimed
A6-Right operation on wrong object C6-Wrong check on wrong object
A7-Wrong operation on right object Retrieval Errors
A8-Operation omitted R1-Information not obtained
A9-Operation incomplete R2-Wrong information obtained
A10-Wrong operation on wrong object R3-Information retrieval incomplete
Information Communication Errors Selection Errors
I1-Information not communicated S1-Selection omitted
I2-Wrong information communicated S2-Wrong selection made
I3-Information communication incomplete
2.3. Step 3: identify opportunities for cognitive errors
The SHERPA taxonomy considers mainly action, perceptual, and communication errors. It does not explicitly 
consider decision errors, although they are implied in some taxonomic items like A10– Wrong operation on wrong 
object. It is recommended that additional Decision items be added to the SHERPA taxonomy to ensure that decision 
errors are considered. Note that these Decision errors may overlap with other items in the taxonomy. This overlap is 
inconsequential to the analysis. Suggested decision errors to augment SHERPA’s taxonomy are found in Table 2. 
Note that some taxonomies like TRACEr and IDHEAS may be more complete with regard to cognitive types of 
errors and may not require this separate guidance in Step 3.
Table 2. Additional cognitive items to augment the SHERPA taxonomy.
Decision Errors
D1-Correct decision based on wrong/ missing information
D2-Incorrect decision based on right information
D3-Incorrect decision based on wrong/ missing information
D4-Failure to make a decision (impasse)
2.4. Step 4: identify risk significant events
Not all errors are risk significant. In order to align the HFE with the level of task decomposition appropriate in 
PSA or QRA, each identified task should be considered in terms of its opportunity to have an impact on safety, 
namely to cause or exacerbate a fault in a hardware system. If the task is not connected to a hardware system related 
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to the safety of the facility or process, it can usually be discarded from the analysis. An exception occurs where the 
safety of individuals (e.g., loss of life) is a modeled risk and is caused by human action or inaction.
2.5. Step 5: synthesize human failure events
Although there remains no authoritative definition of what essential elements comprise the HFEs used in HRAs, 
for the present purposes consider the HFE to be all actions tied to a particular hardware failure outcome. This means 
that typically all tasks related to a single hardware system or a single safety outcome should be grouped together as a 
single HFE. Failure to cluster tasks at the right level of HFE decomposition can result in spurious outcomes as HRA 
methods are used for human error quantification. HFEs are typically modeled in the PSA or QRA as nodes in fault 
trees. Depending on the logic used to connect HFEs together, the overall logic model may represent multiplicative 
(AND gate) or summative (OR gate) functions of the HEPs. If a series of unaggregated tasks from the HTA is 
treated as individual HFEs, this can have the effect of lowering the overall HEP for AND gates or raising the overall 
HEP for OR gates.
2.6. Step 6: consider drivers on performance
Many contemporary HRA methods use PSFs to account for the mechanisms that increase or decrease 
performance. A commonly used PSF-based HRA method is the SPAR-H method [5]. In the SPAR-H method, PSFs 
are associated with multipliers to raise or lower a default or nominal human error rate. The SPAR-H method is 
strictly a quantification approach that provides no guidance on defining the HFEs. As such, the method assumes pre-
defined HFEs from the PSA, and it is particularly susceptible to generating spurious HEPs when the HFEs are not 
defined at the appropriate level of decomposition. SPAR-H was originally developed in support of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s Accident Sequence Precursor program [16] and is therefore optimized to set the PSF 
levels retrospectively according to information available in an incident that has already occurred. As such, selecting 
the PSFlevels prospectively can be challenging. It is important as part of data collection to consider what-if
scenarios such as “Could time be a factor in overall performance on this task?” or “Could the quality of procedures 
affect the outcome of this task?” 
Per recent step-by-step guidance on SPAR-H [17], it is appropriate to consider only those PSFs that have a 
dominant effect on the outcome of the HFE. These PSFs should be considered in terms of their positive and negative 
effect. It is assumed that only the strongest or dominant drivers on performance should be considered in a 
prospective SPAR-H analysis. Table 3 may help to classify relevant PSFs for each HFE. Each HFE should be 
walked through with subject matter or process experts according to the SPAR-H PSFs. Any strongly positive or 
negative drivers should be discussed and used to select an appropriate PSF level. Note that recent work in the 
petroleum sector has redefined the basic list of SPAR-H PSFs to be more suitable to petroleum HRA [18]. Where 
appropriate, Table 3 may of course be modified to reflect a different list of PSFs, either through customization of the 
SPAR-H PSFs or use of another HRA method’s PSFs.
Table 3. SPAR-H performance driver table.
Available Time
Would you have plenty of time (POSITIVE) or not enough time (NEGATIVE) to 
complete the tasks?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Stress
Would you feel stressed during the scenario? Would it improve (POSITIVE) or 
hinder (NEGATIVE) your performance?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Scenario Complexity
Would it be easy (POSITIVE) or difficult (NEGATIVE) to diagnose the situation 
properly?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Execution Complexity
Would it be easy (POSITIVE) or difficult (NEGATIVE) to carry out the activities 
in the scenario?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
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Experience/Training
Would your previous practice and training on this type of scenario improve 
(POSITIVE) or hinder (NEGATIVE) your performance?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Procedures
Would procedures adequately aid (POSITIVE) or fail to aid (NEGATIVE) the 
completion of the tasks?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Human-Machine Interface
Is the labeling and organization of information clear and helpful (POSITIVE) or 
unclear and misleading (NEGATIVE)?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Fitness for Duty
Are there physical factors like being wide awake (POSITIVE) or tired 
(NEGATIVE) that would affect your performance?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
Work Processes
Would organizational factors help (POSITIVE) or get in the way (NEGATIVE) of 
resolving this scenario?
POSITIVE NEGATIVE N/A
2.7. Step 7: perform the human error quantification
Once reasonable errors have been identified, the HFEs have been defined, and the drivers on performance have 
been predicted, it is finally possible to use this information to complete the human error quantification. Again, using 
SPAR-H as an example, in the final stage, the analyst would complete the quantification worksheets provided with 
the method. The SPAR-H process entails:
x Determination if the HFE is Diagnosis (cognitively engaging), Action (behaviorally based), or both. This 
determines the starting or nominal HEP (NHEP).
x Assign the PSF levels for the HFE.
x Mathematically compute the basic HEP by taking the product of the nominal HEP and the PSF multipliers that 
correspond to the PSF assignment levels. If there are both Diagnosis and Action worksheets, the basic HEP is 
computed separately for Diagnosis and Action and then added:
x HEPbasic = NHEPdiagnosisx PSFs + NHEPactionx PSFs (1)
x Apply a correction factor to ensure no HEP is greater than 1.0.
x Adjust the HEP for dependency between HFEs where appropriate.
It should be remembered that most HFEs include both Diagnosis and Action tasks [17]. Only dominant drivers on 
performance should be considered as PSFs, and any assumptions that inform PSF level assignment should be 
carefully considered and documented. Recovery actions identified as part of the HRA and SHERPA analysis (see 
Steps 1 and 2 above) should be documented. If recovery actions are modeled separately in the PSA event or fault 
trees, they should simply be documented as part of the analysis. Where a sequence of successive HFEs is present, 
dependency should be considered in the analysis per the SPAR-H worksheets. Note that recent guidance [19] has 
suggested that dependency corrections to the HEP should in many cases be omitted, as it can result in overly 
conservative values. All such assumptions should be carefully documented to aid in the potential verification and 
reuse of HRAs. Similar processes can be followed with other HRA methods as preferred. The SPAR-H method is 
simply presented as a method that aligns well to both HTA and HRA.
3. Discussion
This paper has reviewed the difficulty in defining HFEs for human factors analysts who are completing HRAs 
where no PSA(or similar model like a QRA) is readily available or the PSAdoes not include HFEs. As HRA is 
applied to novel domains beyond its traditional use in nuclear power, the completeness of PSAs, particularly with 
regard to treatment of human actions, will vary considerably. In the absence of predefined HFEs in the PSA, it is 
important to have a standard, traceable approach to facilitate HRAs that can serve as standalone analyses and can be 
incorporated into PSAs with the right level of information and granularity. The challenge for the analyst in 
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completing the bottom-up, task analysis driven approach is that there has been no clear process to bridge the task 
analysis to the completed HRA. This paper has provided initial guidance to help the analyst in such cases. In 
particular, it is important that the bottom-up defined tasks properly match the granularity required of the HFEs to fit 
the PSA. It is hoped the guidance in this paper will aid analysts in making this match and in ensuring interanalyst 
consistency in future HRAs. This guidance should, of course, serve only as a starting point, and analysts should 
refine and revise it according to their needs.
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